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The Argument from Self-Creation: A Refutation of Act-Consequentialism








The standard form of act-consequentialism requires us to perform the action with the best consequences; it allows choice only on those rare occasions when several actions produce equally good results.  This characteristic conflicts with our ordinary conception of morality.  We ordinarily assume we may choose from a range of moral options even though some do not bring about the best possible results.  
In this battle between act-consequentialism and ordinary morality, act-consequentialism seems to have the upper hand.  Options are puzzling—why would morality allow us to make the world a worse place than we could?  A major challenge in contemporary ethical theory is to justify options.  
This paper offers a new argument for moral options and against act-consequentialism.  The argument turns on the insight that some valuable things cannot exist unless there are genuine moral options.  Specifically, only with options can people engage in the fundamental good of creating decision-procedures for choosing among different life-paths.  In contrast, act-consequentialism cannot generate more than a negligible amount of this fundamental good, and so it cannot make the world the best place it can be.  This article contends that because of these facts, morality must admit of a significant number of moral options; act-consequentialism is false.  
The principal goal of this paper is to describe a strategy for showing that options exist and to establish that all the major steps of the argument are plausible.  In addition, the paper contends that the Argument from Self-Creation is superior to previous explanations of options, because it traces our intuitions about the value of options and autonomy to their deeper source in self-creation.  
Let us begin with a discussion of the value of creating decision-procedures for one’s life.

The Argument from Self-Creation

The Value of Creating Decision-Procedures for One’s Life​[1]​  

This paper defines “decision-procedures” as sets of rules or values that tell us how to select from among alternative actions.  Some decision-procedures might be right for us because we choose them.  These will be call “created decision-procedures”.  Other decision-procedures are correct independently of whether we choose them.  These will be called “fixed”, meaning that, while we may discover them and even make a choice to embrace or affirm them, we do not make them right through our choices.  These distinctions become clearer if we contrast two things: (i) the decision-making process of someone living in a world governed by the act-consequentialist principle, and (ii) the decision-making process of someone who lives in a world where morality admits of broad moral options.  
	(i)  The Act-Consequentialist World.  In such a world, people might exercise moral judgement and determine that the act-consequentialist principle is correct.  They might also decide to use the act-consequentialist principle as their decision-procedure (rather than, say, simply ignoring morality altogether).​[2]​  After that, they would need to figure out how well-off they and others would be in various states.  Finally, this data would be inserted into the act-consequentialist calculus, and the individuals would make a choice to follow the calculus’s instruction.  Despite all these possibilities, though, people in the act-consequentialist world cannot make a decision-procedure right through their choices.  The act-consequentialist principle would have been the right decision-procedure whether or not they knew it or chose to follow it.  
	(ii) The World with Options.  Now consider people who live in a world where morality admits of broad moral options—e.g., a moral system like commonsense morality.  In some respects their lives would be similar to the act-consequentialists’.  They could exercise moral judgement when determining that ordinary morality is true.  They could make a choice about whether to live by those principles.  Assuming they chose to live morally, they would often estimate how various states affect everyone’s well-being.  Finally, they would sometimes face choices in which the correct decision-procedure is fixed by morality.  For instance, when deciding between adultery or not, the right decision-procedure is “never commit adultery”, and that rule is correct independently of their choices.  
	But there are significant differences too.  In the world of ordinary morality, the people would often have the opportunity to correctly exercise their capacity for choice—their ability to decide upon decision-procedures when neither morality nor rationality fixes one for them.​[3]​  Such decision-procedures would obviously be “created” in a way that the act-consequentialists’ are not.  Moreover, those procedures would be right for a new and different reason.  The act-consequentialists’ decision-procedure is right because no other is rationally or morally acceptable.  In contrast, the ordinary moralists’ decision-procedures are right because they have decided upon them.  So while both groups decide which decision-procedures to use, the ordinary moralists’ decision-procedures are “enacted” in the quasi-legal sense.  Just as laws become laws because a legislature enacts them, their decision-procedures are made right through an act of their will.
	In sum, people in a world governed by ordinary morality could (a) exercise their capacity for choice, and so (b) create some of their decision-procedures, which (c) are made right through acts of their will.  Call this activity creating decision-procedures for one’s life.  Related activities—e.g., discovering and affirming the act-consequentialist rule—may have substantial value, but creating decision-procedures can add extra value to a life.  
	To see why, note that creating decision-procedures may not always add value.  Suppose a person decides to flip a coin, and if the coin comes up heads, he will give one-thousand dollars to the poor per year, and if it comes up tails he will always spend it on himself.  This way of creating a decision-procedure may have no special value.  Nor may creating decision-procedures from a narrow range of options—e.g., if morality directed our actions except when we were deciding between minor things, such as brands of clothing or food.  In the first example the problem is that the decision-procedures do not result from a sufficiently autonomous deliberation.  In the second, the options are not important enough.  This paper will not digress into the standards of ‘autonomy’ and ‘importance’.  Instead consider an example which shows that creating decision-procedures sometimes adds value to a life.
	The case is inspired by an example from Joseph Raz.​[4]​  Some people are stranded on a desert island, and their lives are precarious in a peculiar way.  If they make certain unwise choices, they know they will fall victim to dangerous animals, starvation, or some other misery.  Their only alternative is the one and only one set of choices that result in a decent life.  Perhaps they must collect food at a specific time, take shelter from predators at a specific time—all on an extremely strict schedule.  Since they are rational, they choose the plan, and as a result their lives are perfectly acceptable.  But while affirming this decision-procedure may have some value, their lives are also impoverished in a special way.  They never exercise their capacity for choice, create decision-procedures, or make those decision-procedures right through their will.
	Henceforth “creating decision-procedures” always refers to the forms of that activity which seem to have value.  Why do they have value?  Because exercising our capacity for choice allows us to stand in a special relationship of responsibility to our decision-procedures; and because those decision-procedures partly constitute our identity.  
	First, responsibility.  Here the term does not mean “moral responsibility”.  Instead, it is used in a more basic way to simply indicate “the source of”.  Both ordinary moralists and act-consequentialists are responsible for the fact that they have adopted their respective decision procedures; if they had made different choices, they would have had different decision-procedures.  However, for reasons given above, only the ordinary moralists can be responsible for the correctness of their decision-procedures.  
	Given this, why is it particularly valuable to be responsible for the correctness of one's decision-procedures?  The answer is that decision-procedures constitute part of our identity.  Arguably, they constitute the most important part of our identity, for as Josiah Royce wrote:

…the answer to the question “Who are you?” really begins in earnest when a man mentions his calling, and so actually sets out upon the definition of his purposes and of the way in which these purposes get expressed in his life.  And when a man goes on to say, “I am the doer of these and these deeds, the friend of these friends, the enemy of these opposing purposes, the member of this family, the one whose ideas are such and such, and are so and so expressed in my life,” the man expresses to you at length whatever is most expressible and worth knowing in answer to the question, “Who are you?”
     To sum, then, I should say that a person, an individual self, may be defined as a human life lived according to a plan.​[5]​
	
Royce’s description requires one emendation.  Royce seems to suggest that it is long-term planning that is valuable, as if those who decide to ignore the long term and “live each day as if it were the last” have little or no identity.  Not so.  The contrast is not between the planned and the carefree, but rather those with self-created decision-procedures and those without.  The carefree have a definite way of making decisions, a plan (at least currently) for their life, and one that is made right for them because of their choice to embrace it.  The contrast class is the class of people who live in a world where all correct decision-procedures are fixed independently of their choices, by morality or rationality.  But that emendation aside, Royce’s explanation is fundamentally correct: creating decision-procedures is valuable because it allows us to stand in a special relationship of responsibility to an important part of identity itself.

The Possibility That a World with Self-Creation is the Best

The previous section showed that creating decision-procedures from among genuine options added value beyond that gained by merely discovering and embracing them.​[6]​  As has been noted, similar arguments are not new to the philosophical literature on consequentialism.  But this section and the sections that follow aim to show that these considerations can be used in a novel way to show that act-consequentialism is false.  That argument begins with a discussion of how much value self-creation has, and in particular, a comparison between the value of creating decision-procedures and other highly valuable things.
	One could do this locally, by asking whether a single instance of creating a decision-procedure has more or less value than other things.  But that would be potentially misleading, because it may be that the value of one additional instance of creating a decision-procedure is always negligible, but that the loss of self-creation over a lifetime is more significant.  Therefore it seems more appropriate to make global assessments.  In particular, this paper will compare two situations that are of obvious relevance when debating with act-consequentialists over the existence of options, and which will become quite important in later arguments.  The first is the world that would result if morality admitted of significant moral options and individuals created decision-procedures for themselves.  The second is the world that would come about if act-consequentialism were true and individuals followed its commands.  
	Before we talk about which world is in fact better, the first step is to realize that it is possible that the world with self-creation is superior.  
	Act-consequentialism directs us to put the world in the best state it can be in.  If this is our goal, it might seem like a world in which this rule is followed must be the best world possible.  However, consider this complication.  Suppose that moral rules not only told us what states of affairs to bring about, but somehow changed which states were possible.  For instance, imagine that in a world governed by act-consequentialism, the possible states of the world are A, B, C…J, with each successive letter indicating higher overall utility and thus J being best.  Act-consequentialism would direct us to produce state J.  Now imagine as well that if enacted a different moral code with options, the world is thereby put into state K, a state which has more good than J but that cannot be brought about if act-consequentialism is true.  In that case, the best world is brought about if the options-code is true.  Moreover, act-consequentialists cannot respond that if K is really better than J, their code will direct us to bring about state K.  Their code eliminates the very possibility of K, and thus cannot direct us to it.  
	In order to see how this might happen, consider several hypothetical scenarios.  In the first the world of act-consequentialism is better, but in the second the world with options is better.
	First, imagine that people must choose between two courses of action: reduce other people’s suffering and produce 100 utiles, or spend resources on themselves and produce 10 utiles.  Imagine as well that creating decision-procedures has added value; if people have a genuine option and can create decision-procedures, this adds 50 utiles to whatever result they bring about through their action.  What happens in a world governed by act-consequentialism?  Because the two courses of action do not have equally good consequences, the people have no options and cannot create valuable decision-procedures.  (Recall that by our earlier stipulation, “creating decision-procedures” always refers to an activity that requires moral options.)  Instead the act-consequentialist rule directs them to reduce suffering and produce 100 utiles.  If 100 such decisions are made, overall utility is increased by 10,000.  This result is better than the result in a world governed by a moral rule that allowed more options.  Given human nature, individuals with options will usually spend resources on themselves, not others.  So most such situations would produce only 60 utiles.  (50 because the individuals created decision-procedures, and 10 because they spend their resources on themselves.)  Iterated 100 times, utility would increase by 6,000, or 4,000 less than in the act-consequentialist world. 
	However, if creating decision-procedures has enough added value—say, 200 utiles—then something curious happens: we always get the best result by letting individuals create decision-procedures.  (The number 200 is picked here for clarity; a more realistic value will be considered later on.)  Creating decision-procedures produces 200 utiles, so even if the individuals always spend their resources on themselves, the total utility increase is 210 with each decision.  In contrast, the act-consequentialist rule cannot direct people to gain the 200 utiles by creating decision-procedures.  Why not?  Remember that creation of decision-procedures requires genuine options, and that the act-consequentialist rule says an option exists only if self-indulgence and relieving suffering have equally good consequences.  They do not.  Thus there is no option and valuable creation of decision-procedures is not possible.  The best the act-consequentialist rule can do is direct individuals to spend their resources relieving suffering.  The overall utility gain is 100—110 less than if the world were governed by a less-stringent moral rule.  
	These examples show that, depending on the value of creating decision-procedures, a world governed by a system admitting of options may always be better than a world governed by act-consequentialism.  Now of course the utility values used here were simply made up; all that has been shown is that if the creation of decision-procedures has a high enough value, then a world governed by the act-consequentialist rule is not as good as a world governed by a less directive rule that admits of options.  The paper’s next task is to argue that creating decision-procedures adds a great deal of value to a life and so this possibility is plausibly regarded as a reality.

The High Value of Creating Decision-Procedures 

We can judge the added value of creating decision-procedures by asking how much informed and reflective people generally value it.  Imagine a life without the creation of decision-procedures or the responsible identity-formation that goes with it; at best one forms an identity by discovering and affirming act-consequentialism.  Compare this to a life identical in all respects except that it is possible to create decision-procedures and one’s income is, say, 20% lower.  Continue making similar comparisons, changing the last variable to reduced health, reduced security, etc.  If one truly engages with these thought experiments—if one truly imagines a life entirely without the creation of decision-procedures—then the thought experiments reveal that people generally place a high enough value on the creation of decision-procedures that the opportunity to do so should be classified as a fundamental good, along with health, security, external freedom, and others.
	Given this, a world with options might be better than the act-consequentialist world.  If we assume that a moral code strongly influences behavior—an assumption beneficial to act-consequentialists, and which they should grant—then in an act-consequentialist world, individuals will direct resources to the worst off, and this would produce enormous results.  Arguably many problems associated with global poverty would disappear or lessen,​[7]​ many of the world’s poor could obtain basic medical care,​[8]​ and many of the same people would have enough money that they would live decent lives.  The downside of the act-consequentialist world is that individuals cannot create decision-procedures.  
	Now compare this to a world governed by a moral system that admits of options.  (This description is deliberately vague.  If it helps, readers may imagine that morality has the usual negative duties not to harm, a positive duty like the traditional ten percent tithe to the less fortunate, but otherwise allows us to create decision-procedures for our lives.  They may also imagine some more demanding system that nonetheless allows options.)  The improvements in this world would not be as great as in the act-consequentialist world.  But individuals would create decision-procedures for their lives, the world would contain that thing of value, and in that respect it would improve.
	The crucial question is whether the value of the increases in health, happiness, etc. in the act-consequentialist world is greater or smaller than the value of allowing everyone the opportunity to enact the decision-procedures that partially form their identity.  The answer is not straightforward.  The descriptions of the two worlds are vague.  Moreover, even if we had precise factual descriptions, we would still have to place values on those situations.  Still, recall a point from the introduction.  The goal of this paper is not to offer definitive evidence for each step in the Argument from Self-Creation.  Instead the goal is to show that those steps are plausible.  And since creating decision-procedures is of fundamental value, it is plausible that a world with some options will be better than the act-consequentialist world.  Compare similar calculations about other fundamental goods such as liberty or accomplishment.  If we had to trade away health to get a world with more liberty or accomplishment, it is plausible that we should.  And since the creation of decision-procedures is a fundamental good like liberty or accomplishment, it is plausible that we should favor it over health as well.




The Argument from Self-Creation is not complete; so far the paper has only argued that it is plausible that the best world would be brought about if an options-code were correct, but it has not been argued that such a code is therefore actually correct.  But at the risk of interrupting the main argument, it is important to consider an act-consequentialist objection that has surely occurred to some readers.  
	Traditionally, act-consequentialists have not acknowledged that the creation of decision-procedures (from among genuine options) could have added value.  Perhaps they felt compelled to reject that idea because act-consequentialism virtually eliminates options.  But act-consequentialists can admit that the creation of decision-procedures from among genuine options has added value.​[9]​  They can simply say that we get the added value of creating decision-procedures only when individuals face two courses of action with equally good consequences—i.e., a moral option within the act-consequentialist system—and then choose to create decision-procedures.  Furthermore, act-consequentialists can also say that the added value of creating decision-procedures, like the value of everything else, should be inserted into the consequentialist calculus.  The calculus may say that the best and required course of action involves steering the world so that a tie occurs and some individual may create decision-procedures.  Or the best and required course of action may direct us to expend our effort saving the poor rather than steering the world into ties.
	In response this paper does not deny that the act-consequentialist rule can operate on any axiology, including one where creation of decision-procedures has value.  Instead, this paper denies that a world in which act-consequentialism acknowledged that self-creation has value, and in which the act-consequentialist calculus was followed, would be the best possible.  Here is why.  Act-consequentialism does not merely direct us to bring about the best state of the world.  If it did, no other moral system could steer us toward any state that was better.  Instead, act-consequentialism directs us to bring about the best state of the world compatible with act-consequentialism itself.  Moreover, it has been argued that act-consequentialism changes the very states of affairs that can come about, ruling out the possibility of certain states of affairs which might otherwise be the best.  Specifically, act-consequentialism eliminates options whenever two courses of action do not have equally good consequences.  So even if self-creation is the best thing that can be done in that situation, act-consequentialism cannot direct us toward self-creation.  Self-creation requires the options which act-consequentialism itself eliminates.
	An example may make this clearer.  Imagine again that 100 situations will arise in which individuals must make decisions about what to do.  Imagine as well that the optimific state of affairs is one in fifty percent of the decision-situations—the even-numbered ones, for simplicity’s sake—allow options and thus allow individuals to create decision-procedures for themselves.  It may turn out, as a matter of empirical fact, that in situation 2, 4, 6, etc., the choices available to individuals are not all equally good.  Thus if act-consequentialism is true, individuals have no options in situations 2, 4, 6, etc.  From this it follows that they cannot self-create in those situations and that the optimific state of affairs (in which fifty percent of decision-situations involve options) is simply not available.
	This same example answers a related consequentialist objection.  Act-consequentialists might say that if creating decision-procedures has such high value, then act-consequentialism will direct individuals to create ties—situations in which two options are equally good—so that individuals may self-create.  But this response is implausible, because presumably ties are (as a matter of empirical fact) rare and hard to produce.  To use our earlier example, we can imagine that in situation 1, an individual realizes that it would be optimific if he had options and could self-create in situation 2.  He would therefore know that he should try to rig the world so that in situation 2, two of his possible courses of action are actually good.  But in fact he simply may not be able to do this (at least not without offsetting utility costs), and more importantly, he may not be able to create such ties as often as he would need to in order to make the world contain the ideal amount of self-creation.​[10]​    

The Relevance of these Calculations: Reasons for Action

This paper has compared two things: (i) the world that would arise if act-consequentialism were true and followed, (ii) the world that would arise if morality admitted of many options and individuals self-created.  It was argued that the second world is better, but the fact that the world would be better if morality admitted of options does not straightforwardly imply that morality does admit of options.  So how to bridge the gap?  
	Generally put, the argument to come will be that if a certain state of the world has value, this changes what reasons there are and how individuals should act.  In other words, the argument to come will connect value with reasons, and reasons with moral rules.  These are large topics, and to simplify the subsequent discussion, this paper will argue defend its position in toto.  Instead the main point will be that the position should be acceptable to the act-consequentialists who are the paper’s main opponents.  Thus this paper uses the previous considerations about self-creation in a novel way, a way that turns act-consequentialism against itself.  
	So begin with act-consequentialism.  Act-consequentialists believe that certain things (typically human welfare) have value.  And, although act-consequentialists often spend too little time discussing reasons, they also seem to assume that if one state of affairs has more value than another, one has more reason to bring about the former than the latter.​[11]​  This paper grants these points.
	However, these points alone do not determine what we ought to do, because even if one knows how much reason there is to pursue each course of action, one still does not know whether one is rationally and morally​[12]​ required to act on the strongest reasons.  Now act-consequentialists typically believe that rationality is maximizing, but of course theirs is not the only available position.  For instance, one might believe that it is rationally acceptable to act on any reasons so long as they are strong enough.  Call these different principles governing the relationship between reasons and rationality rules of rationality.  Why opt for the maximizing rule of rationality that one is rationally required to act on the strongest reasons?
	This is a matter of philosophical contention, of course.​[13]​  Despite the contention, though, it is only a slight simplification to say that act-consequentialists’ main argument for maximizing rationality is that it is intuitive.  Thus Samuel Scheffler writes:

The kind of rationality that consequentialism seems so clearly to embody, and which makes so much trouble for views that incorporate agent-centered restrictions, is what we may call maximizing rationality.​[14]​  

And of this conception, Scheffler says that:

…it is not peculiar to consequentialism.  On the contrary, it is a fundamental and familiar conception of rationality that we accept and operate with in a very wide and varied range of contexts.  …the ‘spellbinding force’ of consequentialism, its capacity to haunt even those who do not accept it, derives from the fact that it appears to embody a notion of rationality which we recognize from myriad diverse contexts, and whose power we have good independent reason to respect.​[15]​

Act-consequentialists often make the point more colloquially using the rhetorical question with which this paper began: How can it ever be right to make the world less good than it could be?  
	Notice, though, that if our previous discussion of self-creation is correct, we now have an answer to this rhetorical question.  It has been argued that the best world can exist only if the maximizing rule of rationality is false.  Instead a better world is brought about if the right rule of rationality does not require maximization but instead admits of some options and therefore allows self-creation.  
	Moreover, this answer should be acceptable to act-consequentialists, because it comports with their way of relating value to rationality.  Act-consequentialists think that the rules of rationality must be structured so as to bring about the best state of affairs.  They assume that the way for those rules to bring about the best state of affairs is by directing agents to maximize the good in every situation.  All that has been pointed out here is that, given the value of self-creation and its relationship to options, this assumption needs to be altered.  Sometimes the way for the rules of rationality to bring about the best state of affairs is by not requiring maximization but instead allowing options.​[16]​  
	With these points made, the entire argument can now be pulled together.

Summary of the Argument from Self-Creation

It is valuable to create decision-procedures from among genuine options.  A world governed by act-consequentialism rarely admits of options, so that world lacks the value of self-creation.
	Such considerations are familiar in debates about consequentialism, but what is less-noticed is that in light of them, we face a trade-off.  If the world is governed by act-consequentialism, the added value of creating decision-procedures is eliminated, but many other goods are produced.  In contrast, if the world is governed by a moral theory that admits of options, some of these other benefits are lost, but the added value of creating decision-procedures is gained.  This paper argued that it is plausible that a world with options is better than the act-consequentialist world.  Furthermore, this paper gave a distinct argument that these calculations should matter, especially to act-consequentialists.  Act-consequentialists are correct that the rules of rationality must be structured so as to bring about the best state of affairs.  Morality therefore admits of options; act-consequentialism is false.
	With the argument now drawn together, we can also see that, while the Argument from Self-Creation is certainly related to previous anti-consequentialist arguments, it has several advantages over them as well.  
	Some people object that consequentialism ignores something of fundamental value such as rights or respect.  In response, consequentialists say that if showing respect or not violating a right is good, then it only makes sense to maximize that good.  And in response to this response, the objectors have tried to explain why rights and respect are not only good things, but good things that it is inappropriate to maximize.  However, producing a convincing explanation has proven difficult, and on that score the Argument from Self-Creation is superior.  It shows that a course of action can be best even though act-consequentialism does not and indeed cannot direct us to produce it.  This happens because act-consequentialism changes the very courses of action that exist.  In particular, its truth eliminates options and the valuable creation of decision-procedures.  Since the valuable creation of decision-procedures is almost never a possibility in an act-consequentialist world, the act-consequentialist rule cannot steer anyone toward it, even if that self-creation is the best thing that can be done.  This is why we cannot simply count creating decision-procedures as one more thing in the act-consequentialist calculus.  We produce a better world if we give up on that calculus entirely.
	So the Argument from Self-Creation improves over some deontological arguments against consequentialism.  Now consider another argument against consequentialism, the Argument from Integrity.  Famously, Bernard Williams argued that consequentialism failed to respect individual “integrity”.​[17]​  Samuel Scheffler picked up this theme.​[18]​  He argued that agents have projects and interests—for example, commitments to saving the whales, or to their hobby of performing prestidigitation.  Morality should not forcibly alienate agents from all of their projects and interests.  So, morality must sometimes permit us to pursue our projects and interests.  
	The Argument from Self-Creation has two advantages over Scheffler’s work.
	First, consider an objection to Scheffler's argument by Michael Slote.​[19]​  Scheffler's argument restricts individuals to either maximizing the good or pursuing their own projects and interests.  But this does not align with our ordinary conception of morality.  We normally assume there is a zone of autonomy in which we may do what we want, including pursue our own projects and interests, but also sacrifice our own projects and interests for the benefit of others or for the sake of some lesser project or interest of our own.  
	The Argument from Self-Creation establishes that zone of autonomy.  It explains why morality opens up a certain number of options rather than constantly requiring that we maximize the good, and it does so without implying that when we are not maximizing the good, we must pursue our own project and interests.
	Second, consider Scheffler’s key claim that morality must not forcibly alienate agents from all of their projects.  Scheffler defends that claim as follows:  Each of us is concerned with our projects and interests out of proportion to their weight from an impersonal point of view.  The having of this personal point of view is part of the nature of a person, because as Rawls said, “the correct regulative principle for a thing depends on the nature of that thing”.  Thus morality must allow us to place disproportionate weight on our projects and interests.​[20]​  
	Though the Rawlsian claim may be correct, it is not accepted by act-consequentialists and they are likely to resist it.  In this way the Argument from Integrity contrasts with the Argument from Self-Creation.  The latter relies only on premises which the act-consequentialists do or should accept, given their own ways of thinking about value, reasons, and rationality. 





The Argument from Self-Creation indicates that the right moral system admits of more options than act-consequentialism; it does not give details beyond that.  Nevertheless, the details are sufficient to reveal at least two potential problems with the theory, problems that are similar to those faced by rule-consequentialism.   
	
The Collapse and Incoherence Objections

Two familiar objections to rule-consequentialism are the collapse and incoherence objections.  These are thought to form a Scylla and Charybdis, because rule-consequentialists cannot avoid one without falling victim to the other.  
	First, collapse.  Some people allege that rule-consequentialism “collapses” into act-consequentialism in the following way.  The rule-consequentialist advocates a rule such as “never lie”.  The objector describes a general set of circumstances C in which lying produces more good than not.  Thus the rule “never lie except in circumstance C” better maximizes the good.  The process iterates.  Allegedly, we arrive at a rule that is extensionally equivalent to the act-consequentialist rule.  In essence, then, the collapse objection uses rule-consequentialism against itself.  A standard presupposition of rule-consequentialism is that the right rules are those “whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each new generation has maximum expected value…”.​[21]​  The collapse objection claims that rules which satisfy this criterion are not the ones the rule-consequentialists actually endorse.
	Rule-consequentialists typically respond by saying that if the act-consequentialist rule were accepted and people knew that at any moment they might be sacrificed for the greater good, trust would break down.​[22]​  As a result, the act-consequentialist rule, or anything extensionally equivalent to it, would not bring about the greatest good when actually internalized by the majority of the population.  Relatedly, rule-consequentialists often argue that when assessing a code, one should count the costs of inculcating the rules in each new generation.  It is very costly to get people to learn and accept rules that are both complicated and demanding.  A simpler code is better.
	One thing to notice is that rule-consequentialists admit that their rules may direct an agent to do something that is not, in that situation, optimific.  Instead their claim is that their rules, when generalized internalized, produce the greatest good in toto.  This is all they need to escape the objection, because the objection was not that rule-consequentialism sanctions some individually non-optimific actions.  (That will come later, in the incoherence objection.)  Instead the objection was that rule-consequentialists have contradicted their own premise that the right rules are those whose general internalization produces the greatest good in toto.
	Opponents of rule-consequentialism may concede that the collapse objection has been rebutted, but they allege that rule-consequentialists must now fall victim to the incoherence objection.  What is it?  Unfortunately, that question has no clear answer, because despite widespread claims that this objection is devastating, few people bother to say what it is.​[23]​  The locus classicus is supposed to be Lyons’s justly famous book The Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism.  But the objection is never stated clearly there either.  It is debatable whether Lyons endorsed it in its modern form.
	In light of this lacuna in the philosophical literature, this paper will simply give what seems to be the best form of the objection.  Imagine a situation in which rule-consequentialism directs an individual to bring about a state of affairs that is less good than an available alternative.  Even in the rule-consequentialist system, nothing is of value other than “the good”.  And since value and reasons are connected (in the ways discussed earlier), it must follow that the individual has more reason to bring about the optimific state of affairs.  Since rationality is maximizing, though, it also follows that the individual is rationally required to bring about the optimific state of affairs.  Furthermore, on the assumption that an individual cannot be morally obligated to do what is irrational, it follows that the individual is not morally obligated to bring about the non-optimific state of affairs.  This contradicts rule-consequentialism’s initial instruction, though, and so the theory is incoherent.
Later this paper will ask whether standard forms of rule-consequentialism can escape the incoherence objection.  First, though, this paper explains why the Self-Creation Theory does not fall victim to anything like the collapse and incoherence problems.  
	Start with collapse.  Collapse uses an assumption of rule-consequentialism against itself, the assumption that the right rules are those whose general internalization brings about the greatest good in toto.  Now of course this is not an assumption in Self-Creation Theory or the arguments for it, and so the collapse objection does not directly apply.  The closest assumption made earlier was one shared with act-consequentialism: the right rule(s) of rationality must be those which, if true and followed, bring about the best world possible.  Moreover, it has been argued that such rules are not act-consequentialism’s maximizing rules but rather rules that admit of options.  Thus no collapse occurs.
	To make this clearer, consider a concrete case.  Suppose self-creation has enough value that allowing an individual to decide whether to spend his money on his children or Oxfam is better than requiring him to donate it to Oxfam.  If so, then Self-Creation Theory will allow the man to formulate his own decision-procedure.  Moreover, in such a situation, the individual may choose his children, even though the results of that choice are less good than giving the money to Oxfam.  Now of course this fact alone is not enough to get the collapse objection moving.  As noted above, the collapse objection is not that a theory sanctions some actions that are individually non-optimific.  Instead, to get the collapse objection moving, we must prove that there is some rule which, if true and followed, would produce more overall good in toto than the rules that Self-Creation Theorists endorse.  Thus a proponent of the collapse objection must further claim that the rule “allow individuals to plan except in circumstances C (situations like the Oxfam situation)”, if true and followed, would make the world a better place than the rules of Self-Creation Theory.  
	However, it is simply not true that such a rule, if true and followed, would make the world a better place than the rules of Self-Creation Theory.  To see why, we have to recall how the rules of Self-Creation Theory are determined.  A point stressed in this paper was that when assessing the impact of rules, one cannot just look at the value of the consequences that flow after the decision-procedure is acted upon.  Instead one must compare two things: (i) the value of a state of affairs in which the individual is not allowed to plan but follows a moral directive to give to Oxfam, and (ii) the value of a state of affairs in which the individual is allowed to plan from among genuine options but spends on his children.  In other words, we must remember to count the value of self-creation itself.  The Self-Creation Theory allows planning only when the value of (ii) is greater than the value of (i).  So if Self-Creation Theory allows the individual to plan and not give to Oxfam, that is because such a result is better than a situation in which the individual is directed to give to Oxfam but the value of planning is lost.  Thus the rule “allow individuals to plan except in circumstance C (the Oxfam situation)” cannot produce more good when imposed.  It would make the world worse by taking away the value of planning.  
	Now someone might concede this point and yet try to re-formulate the collapse objection.  They might point out that the optimific action occurs when the individual creates his own decision-procedure and also chooses (freely, for whatever reason) to give to Oxfam.  So if we want the rule which, when imposed, produces the best world in toto, shouldn’t we endorse a rule that directs us to both give and create a decision-procedure—a different rule from the one Self-Creation Theorists have endorsed?  Yes and no.  If such a rule could exist, it would be the rule that brought about the best result, and Self-Creation Theorists would be committed to endorsing it.  However, such a rule cannot exist.  No rule can both allows us to create a decision-procedure and direct us to give to Oxfam, because for reasons given earlier, creating a decision-procedure requires that one not also be independently directed toward one action.  
	It is worth noting that the Self-Creation Theorists’ response to the collapse objection is superior in an important way to standard rule-consequentialist replies.  When applied to typical versions of rule-consequentialism, the collapse objection gets off the ground because objectors successfully identify a rule which, absent externalities such as the difficulty of inculcation, would produce more good in toto than the rule-consequentialists’ rules would.  Rule-consequentialists concede this fact then respond by arguing that the externalities exist, and they back up this contention with empirical considerations, such as the idea that the objectors’ rules might be hard for people to accept or that they might cause trust to erode.  The Self-Creation Theorists have a much stronger response.  They do not rely on externalities.  Instead they argue that the objectors cannot coherently describe a rule that would produce better results in toto than the rules of Self-Creation Theory.  (Recall that the ideal situation, creating a decision-procedure and being directed to give to Oxfam, is simply not available.)  This is a more secure response to the collapse objection because one does not then have to worry that the empirical externalities may turn out not to be present.  For instance, one does not have to worry that the act-consequentialist rule would actually function quite well once society converted to act-consequentialism.  
	So much for collapse.  The next worry is that any reply to the collapse objection leads to incoherence.  Specifically, Self-Creation Theory sometimes leaves agents the option to perform an action that is not optimific—e.g., spending money on their children rather than giving it to Oxfam.  Isn’t that incoherent?
In reply, recall that the objection proceeded in several steps: If a state of affairs is optimific, then there is more reason to bring it about than any other.  Moreover, if there is more reason to bring it about than any other, then since rationality is maximizing, one ought to bring it about.
Self-Creation Theorists have a straightforward answer to this, which is to deny the premise that rationality is maximizing.  Moreover, this is not an ad hoc reply; their rejection was defended earlier.  The grounds were that the right rules of rationality must, if true and followed, bring about the best world possible; and such rules cannot be maximizing rules.
 	Once again this response seems superior to standard rule-consequentialist replies.  This paper considers Brad Hooker’s reply in particular, since his is often taken to be the best form of rule-consequentialism going.
	Hooker describes the incoherence objection as follows.​[24]​  Rule-consequentialists have an “overarching commitment to maximize the good”​[25]​ with every act that is somehow “manifested in the theory itself…in the principles employed to morally assess rules and actions”.​[26]​  Because of this commitment, and because rule-consequentialism sanctions some individual actions that do not maximize the good, the theory is incoherent.  
	Hooker responds to the incoherence objection by pointing out that his form of rule-consequentialism is simply a combination of two things: (i) a set of rules for evaluating acts, (ii) a foundational principle which says that the right rules are those which, when generally internalized, would produce the greatest expected good.  Neither of these is (or entails) a commitment that each act should maximize the good.  Moreover, he rejects the idea that (ii) is deduced from some larger principle that “the goal of morality is to produce the best consequences”.  Instead his argument for rule-consequentialism is that rule-consequentialism is the theory we reach in reflective equilibrium.
	But this does not escape the incoherence objection, or at least not in an unproblematic way.  In Hooker’s moral system, there is only one thing of value, “the good”.  It follows that if one state of affairs is better than another, there is more reason to bring the former about.  Hooker’s only option is therefore to deny that rationality is maximizing, which is what he does when he affirms that the right rules are those which, when generally internalized, would produce the greatest expected good.​[27]​  (Recall that such rules are, by hypothesis, not maximizing ones.)  Hooker’s defense of this move is that his rules are the ones we arrive at in reflective equilibrium, but this ignores the point quoted earlier from Scheffler—namely, that it is overwhelmingly intuitive that rationality is maximizing.  And intuitions such as these are supposed to be a part of the process of reflective equilibrium.




Another objection to act- or rule-consequentialism is that consequentialism is a theory of right action and not necessarily a decision-procedure.  Thus consequentialists cannot rule out the possibility that, as Richard Arneson put it, “the criterion of correct moral action should be kept secret, reserved for the few…”.​[28]​  Put in the specific terms of this paper, the problem can be posed as follows.  Above it was argued that creation of decision-procedures can occur only when individuals believe they face options.  But from then on, the Argument from Self-Creation seemed to assume that the creation of decision-procedures really required options.  That assumption simplified presentation, but it also left a gap.  If the creation of decision-procedures adds value to a life, and if we want the normative rules that produce the best world, then one option is to adopt the Self-Creation Theory.  However, another option -- which seems equally good -- is to adopt rules that (a) always require optimific action, thus virtually eliminating moral options, but (b) also mandate that these requirements be kept hidden so that individuals will believe they face options and hence will create decision-procedures for their lives.
	A traditional response to this objection is to argue that moral codes must be public.​[29]​  This standard response is open to Self-Creation Theorists, but they have several new ones as well.  
	First, consider someone who creates decision-procedures which partly form his identity, but does so only because he falsely believes that he faces options.  In truth morality requires specific actions of him, and the decision-procedures he creates are formed in ignorance of these moral demands.  Now what he does counts as the creation of decision-procedures, but arguably this creative act has no value, or at least less.  As noted above, we think that the creation of decision-procedures has value only if it is a certain sort of rational process, and arguably somebody who is completely ignorant of important reasons that bear upon his decisions is not engaged in the sort of rational planning that has value.
	Second, it was argued above that the creation of decision-procedures gets its added value in part from the fact that the procedures we enact are made right through our choices.  But if the right rule was truly the (non-public) act-consequentialist rule, then none of our plans would be made right for us because we chose them.  They would not be right at all.





The Argument from Self-Creation is significant for several reasons.
	The most obvious is that it disproves act-consequentialism and it establishes the existence of options.
	The second is that the explanation may disprove, not just act-consequentialism, but any highly directive moral theory, including highly directive forms of rule-consequentialism and highly directive deontological theories.
	A third reason is that it improves on other attempts to refute act-consequentialism and establish options.  Unlike standard deontological responses to act-consequentialism, Self-Creation Theory can explain why there are some human goods that cannot be maximized through the act-consequentialist calculus.  Yet it does so using premises that act-consequentialists should accept, and in that way the Argument from Self-Creation is superior to the standard argument from integrity as well.  
	A fourth merit is that the argument leads to a theory which does not face the standard collapse and incoherence problems that plague rule-consequentialism.  In addition, the argument also provides us with an explanation for the publicity of morality than is not ad hoc but rather grounded in the nature of the theory itself.  
	A fifth advantage of the argument (not previously mentioned) is that, even though it disproves certain highly demanding moral theories, it does so without implying that morality is as lax as many people assume it to be.  So-called “ordinary morality” is often thought to require very little of us.  However, such laxity cannot be justified by the Argument from Self-Creation, because however valuable we think it is to create one’s decision-procedures, one could enjoy the benefit of such a life even if morality is more demanding than “ordinary morality”.  This result is welcome to many of us.  Intuitively we feel that ordinary morality’s minimal requirements make no sense, and we welcome a defense of options that does not slide into a defense of a lax ordinary morality with only minimal obligations to others.
	Finally, and relatedly, the Argument from Self-Creation shores up a pure appeal to intuition.  In response to the act-consequentialist challenge of justifying options, some people have felt no need for a theoretical justification; they have asserted that options are so intuitive that we cannot arrive at any other conclusion after a process of reflective equilibrium.  But while we may feel confident that options exist, an intuitive argument does not tell us why.  The Argument from Self-Creation shores up our intuitions.  It traces the existence of autonomy and options back to the fundamental good of self-creation.













^1	  This section expands on work by Dan Brock (“Defending Moral Options”), and Josiah Royce and Seana Shiffrin, whose works are cited below.  My position is also inspired by work on autonomy, integrity, and consequentialism done by Shelly Kagan (texts cited below, but also “Replies to My Critics”), Michael Slote, Samuel Scheffler, and Bernard Williams.  The discussion of giving direction to one’s life might be usefully compared to discussions of the “confinement objection” in Murphy’s Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, p. 26ff, and Scheffler’s Human Morality, chapter six.
^2	  There are debates about whether, if act-consequentialism it true, it must also be the correct decision-procedure.  Here and throughout this is assumed, but the assumption is reconsidered below.
^3	  Some might feel that when morality does not dictate a decision-procedure, rationality always does—i.e., that they do not create plans by exercising a “capacity for choice” but by discovering an objectively correct path.  This is a deep and difficult objection which cannot receive complete treatment in this short space.  Briefly, though, it seems that the phenomenology cuts the other way.  Consider the options we often face.  We can become philosophers, twiddle our thumbs, write children’s books, head for Nigeria and work with the poor, etc.  And while some paths may not give value to our life (e.g., thumb-twiddling), others all seem like suitable candidates.  No single path is dictated by rationality. 
^4	  See “the Hounded Woman” on p. 374 of The Morality of Freedom.  
^5	  The Philosophy of Loyalty, pp. 78-79.  The last sentence is quoted by Rawls in A Theory of Justice, p. 358, which first drew my attention to the Royce.  Similar points are made in Shiffrin’s “Moral Autonomy and Agent-Centered Options.”  See also Dworkin’s The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, p. 17: “What makes an individual the particular person he is is his life-plan, his projects.  In pursuing autonomy, one shapes one’s life, one constructs its meaning.  The autonomous person gives meaning to his life.”
^6	  Strictly speaking, nothing in the previous text proves that the options must be real as opposed to merely perceived if the creation of decision-procedures is to have value.  The objections section contends with this problem.  For now it is merely assumed that, although one can create decision-procedures even when rationality or morality directs one’s actions, such creation does not add value to a life.
^7	  See Jeffrey Sachs’s The End of Poverty or Thomas Pogge’s World Poverty and Human Rights.
^8	  See the references in the previous footnote as well as Gopal Sreenivasan’s “International Justice and Health: A Proposal.”
^9	  Cf. Christman’s “Constructing the Inner Citadel: Recent Work on the Concept of Autonomy,” p. 117ff.  Christman surveys work on why utilitarians should accept that autonomy has value.  See also Young, “The Value of Autonomy,” p. 37.  
^10	  There are other possibilities.  If utility was difficult to measure and the act-consequentialist calculus was sufficiently coarse, then perhaps ties would be more frequent.  They might also be more frequent on pluralist conceptions of the good and certain interpretations of how to integrate those into act-consequentialism.  If act-consequentialism makes room for enough ties that it is functionally equivalent to the alternative sketched in this paper, then obviously the criticisms here do not apply.  Such a system would be quite far from act-consequentialism as it is ordinarily conceived.  
^11	  On this see Paul Hurley’s “Does Consequentialism Make Too Many Demands, or None at All?” and Frances Howard-Snyder’s “The Heart of Consequentialism”, esp. p. 110ff. 
^12	  Here and throughout the paper presupposes the connection that if something is morally required, it is also rationally required.  
^13	  See Jay Wallace, “Practical Reason,” section 5.
^14	  “Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues,” p. 414.  
^15	  “Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues,” p. 414.
^16	  The text concludes that the rule of maximizing rationality has been disproved.  But it is worth noting that one might describe the upshot of the Argument from Self-Creation differently.  The argument might be taken to allow that the maximing rule is correct, but show that “the good” is not related to reasons in the simple maner ordinarily assumed, where the strength of one’s reasons to pursue a course of action are always proporitional to the amount of good one can produce.  Instead, in situations where morality should allow options, the strength of one’s reasons are not determined by the amount of good each option would produce but instead by one’s decisions about what to puruse, decisions which then make it the case that one has stronger reason to pursue that course of action than any other.  	This way of describing the situation may in fact be more intuitive, but to lay out the argument this way would require re-stating the Argument from Self-Creation in wholly new terms, and that re-description cannot be undertaken here.
^17	  Williams, “Integrity” in Smart and Williams’s Utilitarianism: For and Against.  
^18	  The Rejection of Consequentialism, ch. II.  
^19	  See Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism, ch. II.
^20	  The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 57.  The Rawls quote is explicitly cited by Scheffler; it is from Theory of Justice, p. 29.
^21	  This is Brad Hooker’s formulation from Ideal Code, Real World, p. 32, italics eliminated.  Rule-consequentialists sometimes give slightly different formulations of this idea, but the differences are not relevant here.
^22	  Ideal Code, Real World, p. 94.  The subsequent points come from p. 96ff.
^23	  For a useful survey of references, see Eggleston, Self-Defeat, Publicity, and Interference, chapter five. 
^24	  Hooker actually considers two forms of the incoherence objection.  One is the objection in the text.  Another deals with agents’ psychology and contends that rule-consequentialist agents are psychologically committed to maximizing the good, and thus it is inconsistent for them not to maximize the good when confronted with any opportunity to do so.  Cf. discussion in Card, “Inconsistency and the Theoretical Commitments of Hooker’s Rule-Consequentialism,” p. 245ff.  See also Eggleston, Self-Defeat, Publicity, and Incoherence, section V; and Law, “Rule-Consequentialism’s Dilemma,” p. 264ff.
^25	  Hooker, “Rule-Consequentialism”, S8.
^26	  This is a quote from Card, “Inconsistency and the Theoretical Commitments of Hooker’s Rule-Consequentialism,” p. 247.  Note that Card’s way of trying to demonstrate the incoherence is not the one spelled out in the rest of the paragraph.
^27	  Hooker might instead accept that rationality is maximizing but claim that in his moral system, there are reasons to obey the rules of rule-consequentialism which are not generated simply because of the good which will be produced if one acts upon them.  His text is unclear on this point.  If Hooker pursued this line, then he would be denying, without further explanation, that reasons are related to the good in the straightforward way described in the text.  C.f. note sixteen above.
^28	  Arneson, “Sophisticated Rule Consequentialism: Some Simple Objections,” p. 246.
^29	  There is a large literature on publicity and consequentialism.  See, e.g., Williams’s “Integrity” in Smart and Williams’s Utilitarianism: For and Against; Rawls, Theory of Justice, section 23; Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.”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